The Revolution in Military Affairs
The lexicon of IW, which was once the preserve of the defence community, has established a firm foothold in both the business and popular press. IW is a high-profile topic, the wider social ramifications of which are not yet grasped fully [3] [4] [5] . A plethora of cognate terms, such as 'cyberwar', 'netwar', 'information terrorism', 'digital warfare', 'neocortical warfare', epistemological warfare', 'netcentric warfare' and 'softwar', is used as shorthand for what military analysts and historians have labelled the Revolution in Military Affairs. Although pundits may tend to inflate the potential strategic significance of IW, while downplaying, or ignoring, the related socio-political, juridical and ethical issues, it would be dangerously myopic of the business community, particularly network-intensive and globally distributed enterprises, to dismiss the construct as journalistic hype. There is already ample and credible evidence (see [6] ) of the vulnerability of corporate information systems and assets to damage, theft and destruction and good grounds to believe that the scope of the threat will grow significantly in the near future, putting pressure on firms to develop the requisite variety of legal countermeasures [7, 8] .
The Revolution in Military Affairs has been triggered by rapid advances in computerization and the spectacular growth of internetworking [9, 10] . Developments in information and communication technologies (ICTs) are likely to alter, irrevocably, the nature and conduct of military engagement, as the prosecution of both the Gulf War and the war in Yugoslavia made clear. The advent of IW is challenging some of the axial assumptions (e.g. about entry barriers and payload symmetries) which underpin established theories of kinetic warfare and forcing strategic analysts and military planners to reconceptualize the likely bases of comparative military and geo-political advantage in the digital age. This is not to say that the theatre of operations will shift entirely from the physical battlefield to the virtual battlespace, but it does suggest that intelligent weapon systems and C 4 I (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence) capability will play even more prominent roles in shaping military strategy and outcomes in the years ahead.
IW seems set to change the rules (offensive and defensive) of the military game. First, IW extends the notion of battlespace into the civilian realm, by acknowledging the acceptability of targeting a nation's information substrate -what Schwartau [11] terms the technoeconomic infrastructure. Public and private networks (whether supporting power supply, banking operations or electronic commerce) become legitimate targets for destruction, degradation or denial of service attacks in a strategic IW context. Information technology (IT) is not merely deployed as a force multiplier in the traditional battlefield, but constitutes a means of achieving full spectrum dominance across physical and logical space. The potential consequences of this nascent trend have been acknowledged explicitly in the USA, where President Clinton established a commission for the protection of the nation's critical infrastructure in 1996 (see [12] ). Second, IW can compensate dramatically for force asymmetries between attacker and target, e.g. a small, but expert, group of well-organized hackers could achieve disproportionate results against a much mightier enemy, if the target were heavily dependent on sophisticated ICTs and if its information assets were vulnerable to intrusion or corruption by external actors. Some, at least, of what is implied by IW in a military context has direct implications for the conduct of business, both traditional forms of trade and virtual commerce, in increasingly competitive domestic and international markets.
Information warfare defined
Early definitions of IW were necessarily militaristic in character. Some of these included long-established collateral practices, such as psychological, electronic and propaganda warfare; some implied the physical destruction of information assets (computers, networks, data resources); some stressed high-technology weapons systems and precision-guided munitions, while others emphasized distortion, deception, disinformation and denial of service, rather than outright physical destruction of either tangible or intangible information assets. However, constrained definitions, which would exclude, for example, the scattering of propaganda leaflets or electronic jamming, but include high-tech activities such as morphing or superimposition of broadcast TV images and planting of malicious software, are likely to be of more help in anchoring and operationalizing the idea of IW. At its most parsimonious, IW is the use of ICTs in lieu of bombs and bullets to achieve specific military objectives.
A 1996 document from the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff [13] defines IW as 'actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks while defending one's own information, information basedprocesses, information systems and computer-based networks'. This definition could be ported easily to the world of business with little or no loss of pertinence. The same holds for Alger's [14] equally crisp definition: 'Information warfare consists of those actions intended to protect, exploit, corrupt, deny, or destroy information or information resources in order to achieve a significant advantage, objective or victory over an adversary'. More succinct still is King [15] , who defines information warfare as 'a conflict between two parties where IT is the primary means of obtaining a defensive or offensive advantage'. Importantly, these three definitions all acknowledge the offensive and defensive nature of IW and also focus on the implicit goal of achieving systematic superiority or advantage over one's adversary, which is, of course, the essence of (corporate) competitive strategy [16] [17] [18] . Table 1 ) to business information assets in the context of IW [7] . The first of these relates to the existence, or continuing availability, of information, which can be destroyed, damaged or rendered inaccessible as a result of an IW strike, thus impairing a firm's ability to operate effectively or meet customer requirements at the expected level. In other cases, the attacker may prefer to change, falsify or replace the target company's information or data resources. Here, the objective is to subvert the trustworthiness or credibility of the information without attempting to destroy or physically degrade the asset: a much more insidious modus operandi. In the third case, the goal may be to breach the target company's internal security systems with the aim of conducting espionage or surveillance activities, or stealing proprietary information or trade secrets without actually damaging or removing the coveted assets from their host environment.
Soft assets

Threat spectrum
The constellation of potential threats facing businesses is large. The motivations, means and methods associated with each class of perpetrator can vary. Some threats originate from inside the target firm (e.g. corrupted insider, disaffected employee, mole), while others come from external actors with either personal (e.g. white-hat hackers) or organizational (e.g. transnational criminals) motives for engaging in IW. In yet other cases, the threat will come from a competing firm or from the government of a Nation State which wishes to support its indigenous industry by weakening the competitive position of its leading rivals in the global marketplace. Presently, it is estimated that more than 20 foreign governments are systematically vacuuming American multinational corporations of $24 billion worth of trade secrets and other intellectual assets every year (see [19] ). In a sense, none of this is new: industrial espionage and State-sponsored techno-economic intelligence gathering have a very long, and often disputatious, history [20, 21] . However, the scale and range of opportunity afforded to would-be aggressors by digital technologies takes us well beyond conventional notions of computer crime and industrial espionage. These kinds of actions are sometimes motivated by opportunistic self-interest, as opposed to a desire to achieve dominance or advantage over a competitor through the deployment of systematic IW tactics and strategies.
Threat credibility and scale
Both inside and outside the US defence community, there is residual scepticism regarding some of the claims made about the scale and significance of the IW phenomenon. Partly, this has to do with the all-toopredictable jockeying for power and resources among the various branches of the armed services, partly with the vested interests of defence contractors, IW consultants and others stakeholders and partly with the feeling that the claims themselves are simply not warranted by the available evidence. That said, George Tenet [22] , Director of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), testified recently before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that American intelligence had 'identified several countries that have governmentsponsored information warfare programs underway'. He did not, however, name names. Earlier in 1999, the US Deputy Secretary of Defense, John Hamre, told two House Armed Service Committees that US information systems were being attacked in such a concerted and systematic fashion that he believed the USA was involved in nothing less than a cyber war conducted by (yet again) unidentified assailants [23] .
In business, there is mounting evidence of the extent of computer crime and prototypical IW. Since 1995, the CSI (Computer Security Institute) and the San Francisco Office of the FBI's (Federal Bureau of Investigation) International Computer Crime Squad have collaborated on surveying security practitioners in Fortune 500 companies, financial and medical institutions, government agencies and other organizations. The survey covers a battery of measures: actual and perceived threats, cost of computer crime, nature of incursions, threat spectrum, probable sources of attack, points of attack, financial losses, corporate espionage and related topics [7] . The results, whatever the limitations of the sample or survey instrument, should have a sobering effect on IW agnostics. By way of illustration, the number of respondents reporting unauthorized use/accessing of their computer systems increased from 42% in 1996 to 64% in 1998. Respondents were asked to rate the most likely sources of cyber attack against their corporate information systems and assets. Both manufacturing and hightechnology companies rated their domestic competitors as the principal threat, with foreign competitors and governments also ranked prominently. The financial toll to the reporting companies is considerable. The 163 firms responding to the CSI/FBI 1999 survey (see [24] ) reported losses which included more than $40 million for theft of proprietary information, $39 million resulting from financial fraud and $3 million arising from denial of service attacks. Given the size of the sample, the numbers are evidently the tip of a very large iceberg. It is, however, important to note that the CSI/FBI survey covers both traditionally motivated computer crime and systematic intrusions more deserving of the IW moniker -intrusions which are designed to enhance the attacker's competitive position in the marketplace. The data from these surveys are leading indicators of the IW trend in the world of business and demonstrate convincingly the need for network-intensive enterprises to institute appropriate defensive policies and practices to harden their information systems against attack and assure high-value information resources.
The nature of information warfare
IW has a number of defining characteristics. The cost of entry can be extremely low (relative to even the most modest form of conventional warfare) and the attacker is often able to operate with anonymity. The stealth and near-invisibility afforded the attacker places the target (or victim) at considerable disadvantage. Second, the attacker can engage remotely and thus the chances of achieving strategic surprise are high [4] . Physical proximity to the enemy, terrain navigability, logistical support and other critical success factors in conventional warfare are no longer part of the combat calculus: the network-based warrior, or cyber terrorist, needs little more than a computer, modem, IP (Internet protocol) address (which, importantly, can be changed with ease, thereby making the attacker even more elusive) and solid hacking skills to strike against selected targets, be they individuals or organizations.
In IW, zero latency/warning is part of the attacker's advantage, which forces the target to go into reactive mode and, in turn, places a premium on high-grade strategic intelligence gathering and analysis. The attacker may be a lone actor (internal or external to the firm which is being targeted) or a member of a more or less organized group, but the target can be completely in the dark as to his/their identity, strength, capabilities and tactical, or strategic, objectives. The attack itself may be opportunistic and merely annoying in character (e.g. e-mail flooding, or tampering with a company's Web page) or it may be highly orchestrated, virulent and persistent in character, such that a company's ability to function effectively is impaired (e.g. network disruption, caused through worms and viruses, or outright destruction of mission-critical data files).
The attacker, as the growing population of cyber stalkers is well aware [25] , also has certain psychological advantages by virtue of being able to determine the timing and pace of events and weapons choice (it could be a virus or logic bomb one day and cyber slander or product defamation another). By varying the mode, frequency and intensity of attack, the assailant is able to maximize the target's uncertainty and frustration, in the process, forcing the victim to deflect scarce resources into containing collateral damage or to alter established behaviours and practices.
Cyber smearing
Denial of service attacks or systematic data corruption and contamination can have extremely adverse effects for business in terms of lost revenues, perceived market credibility and, ultimately, exposure to liability suits. In addition to systems-or data-focused attacks, companies are also increasingly vulnerable to digital defamation and virtual vilification campaigns, both overt and covert. The attractions from the would-be attacker's/ malcontent's perspective are not hard to see: a cyber hate or smear campaign can be launched swiftly and scaled up with relatively little effort across jurisdictional lines and allies can readily be mobilized in the cause, as is evident from the growth of Web 'hate sites' attacking major corporations [26] . Even if the attacker is being economical with the truth, the maligned company (whether its general reputation, a specific product line or employee is the actual target) is inevitably placed on a defensive footing and forced to engage in potentially costly damage limitation exercises [27] .
Threat recognition and containment
It is highly unlikely that reputable firms will engage in offensive IW, given the attendant legal and public relations risks. Even in cases where the opportunity for technical strike-back exists (and the proportionality argument seems convincing), few firms, temptation and moral righteousness notwithstanding, are likely to run the risk of overstepping normative or legal bounds. As the threat of offensive IW actions grows, companies will need to implement a wide variety of security measures. Some of these will be technical, some social and procedural in character. Table 2 provides a partial list of defensive strategies and policies. Ideally, a company will combine awareness raising and intelligence gathering on IW trends, targets, sources and methods with the implementation of technical measures and solutions; notably, the installation of robust firewalls and interdiction techniques, the use of encryption to protect commercial-in-confidence communications and the use of intrusion detection software. The best way for a firm to defend itself against offensive IW actions is to develop as complete an understanding as possible of the portfolio of attack options, platforms and tool sets available to an exceptionally determined and sophisticated aggressor, while at the same time developing an accurate and thoroughgoing sense of its own organizational vulnerabilities and sources of technical weakness. In the case of transnational corporations, even the best thought-out technical defences and most sophisticated cyber-forensics may prove inadequate, given misplaced assumptions about consistency of action and understanding among a culturally diverse and globally distributed workforce. A strictly information systems or engineering approach to security management, which downplays the socio-cultural aspects of organizational life, will likely result in sub-optimal solutions.
Conclusions
IW constitutes a clear and present danger to many firms, even if the nature of the threat is still only vaguely perceived in certain quarters. The cumulative weight of anecdotal and survey evidence demonstrates that the threat to networked organizations is growing, in scope and scale, and that the bottom-line costs are both measurable and significant. Governments and companies are having to invest more heavily in information systems security in an effort to deter ever more sophisticated modes of incursion [28] . This, in turn, merely raises the ante and we can expect to see IW attackers and defenders locked in a spiralling dialectic of strike and counter-strike. One effect of such developments will be a growing appreciation of the need for effective intelligence-gathering on IW trends, threats and technologies and the complexity of associated legal issues. Reliable intelligence on likely assailants (in terms of motivation, capabilities, strength, sophistication, etc) and a clear sense of one's own weaknesses will be important variables in determining the success of a company's defensive IW posture. In business, as in war, to be forewarned is to be forearmed. 
